University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law

2002

The World Trade Organization Appellate Body
Report, European Communities - Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, Mar. 12, 2001, WT/DS135/AB/R
Laura Yavitz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Yavitz, Laura, "The World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, Mar. 12, 2001, WT/DS135/AB/R" (2002). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 206.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/206

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.

The World Trade Organization Appellate
Body Report, European Communities Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, Mar. 12, 2001,
WT/DS 135/AB/R
Laura Yavitz*

INTRODUCTION
Environmentalists across the world celebrated a victory in
September 2000 when a World Trade Organization (WTO)1
panel, 2 for the first time, found that a measure inconsistent with
substantive obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) 3 was nonetheless justified under an environmental exception in GATT Article XX. Given the historical
institutional bias of the WTO towards free trade-often at the
expense of the environment 4-- the appeal of the Asbestos Panel
* born Nielsen. Ph.D research fellow at the University of Copenhagen. LL.B
from the University of Copenhagen 1998, LL.M in International Trade Law from the
University of Arizona 1999; Candidata-Juris from the University of Copenhagen
2001. Special thanks to Professor David A. Gantz at the University of Arizona for
inspiration and support, and to Randy Yavitz for his language skills and patience.
1. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (1995), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement].
2. See WTO Panel Report on European Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Asbestos Panel Report].
3. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867
U.N.T.S. 190, 33 I.L.M 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT] (the two agreements are
identical on the articles discussed in this paper; Articles III, XX and XI).
4. See generally The World Trade Organization and the Environment, at
http://environment.about.com/library/weekly/aa12199.htm (last visited Oct. 18,
2001) (discussing environmentalists' proposed changes to those WTO rules that conflict with international environmental agreements).
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Report caused environmentalists to collectively hold their
breath. With the issuance of the Appellate Body decision in
March 2001, that trepidation appears well founded. While the
decision of the Asbestos Panel Report was upheld, the Appellate
Body chose not to rely on Article XX.1 Deflecting the political
momentum toward invoking the environmental exception, the
Appellate Body relied instead on a judicious view that the sub6
stantive obligations of Article 111:4 were not violated.
This Article explains the Appellate Body's reluctance to invoke the environmental exception found in Article XX of GATT,
why the Asbestos decision contrasts with other environmental
cases previously litigated in the WTO, and why, nevertheless,
this case is positive and important. Section I briefly describes
the WTO and its Appellate Body process. Section II provides a
brief description of Articles III:4 and XI, explains the environmental exception found in Article XX, and summarizes the
GATT/WTO cases involving the environmental exception in Article XX (b) or (g). The factual background of the Asbestos case
and Panel Report are explained in Section III. Section IV explores the surprising Appellate Body ruling on amici curiae
briefs. Section V discusses and critiques the Appellate Body
Report. Section VI evaluates the case's precedential value and
discusses the implications of Asbestos for future WTO panel decisions.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE WTO AND ITS TRADE
BARRIERS

The WTO has 140 members 7 that control over ninety percent of worldwide trade.8 It is the only trade organization with
a worldwide multilateral mandatory and binding dispute settlement mechanism. 9 To join the WTO, member states must
5. See WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities-Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12,
2001), at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Asbestos Appellate Body Report].
6. See id. para. 192 (citing to the Appellate Body's Findings and Conclusions).
7. The WTO in Brief, at http'//www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatis-e/
inbrief e/inbr02 e.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001) [hereinafter The WTO in Briefl. As
of July 26, 2001, there are 142 members of the WTO, and more than 30 observers
are negotiating for membership. Id.
8. Id.
9. See David A. Gantz, Introduction to the World Trade System and Trade
Laws Protecting U.S. Business, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 289, 297 (1997); see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
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agree to use the multilateral system administered by the organization to settle disputes rather than taking unilateral action. 10 The dispute resolution process begins with a consultation
between the parties in dispute. 1 ' If the negotiations are unsuccessful, a panel is appointed to consult with the parties.1 2 The
panel issues a report to the Dispute Settlement Body, 13 which
becomes the Body's ruling unless a consensus of WTO members
vetoes it within sixty days.' 4 Parties can request an appeal
heard by three members of the Appellate Body.1 5 Their decision
can only be rejected by a consensus of the Dispute Settlement
16
Body.
With the Asbestos decision, the WTO once again found itself
at the center of a contest between the environmental exception
and free trade. 7 Recurring conflict surrounding WTO decisions
stems from the different approaches of international environmental law and international trade law. While international
trade law is based on the premise of free trade, international
environmental law uses trade measures to enforce multilateral
or unilateral decisions. The GATT makes it "illegal" for members to enact laws that limit free trade based on environmental
concerns unless a GATT exception applies. In contrast, the International Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES Agreement) prohibits
and limits trade in these species.1 Unfortunately for environmentalists, the determining factor behind WTO decisions has
historically been the premise of free trade.
Although its focus is free trade, the WTO is not by its nature anti-environment. 19 The WTO serves states by harmoniz15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (1995), 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter Understanding on
Rules].
10. Trading
into
Future:
The
Introduction
to
the
WTO,
at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis-e/tif e/dispOe.htm (last visited Oct. 18,
2001) [hereinafter Trading into Future].

11.

Id.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 3.40 (where the European
Community, on behalf of France, claims its measure falls within the environmental
exception).
18. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, opened for signature Mar. 3. 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter
CITES].
19. Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: De-

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vo1.11:43

ing international trade law through the WTO review process
and administrative efforts. 20 In general, the wealthy industrialized WTO members are more interested in the environment
than are the poorer developing countries. Wealthy WTO members are known to set the tone in the headquarters of the WTO
21
in Geneva but are not pushing for any changes at the moment.
In fact, it is likely that the European Union (EU) would stand
alone if it pushed for a revision of existing rules.2 2 Both the EU
and the United States fear that advocating new rules favoring
the environment would result in confrontations with WTO
members who are developing nations. 23 Developing countries
constitute a majority of WTO members and have traditionally
been against rewriting the WTO rules in order to clarify the environmental exceptions. 24 They fear that the industrialized
members would utilize any clarified environmental rules to create trade barriers that would adversely affect their developing
economies. 25 The WTO employs a consensus model for accepting
decisions, increasing the ability of the majority of the developing
countries to block stronger environmental regulations. 26 Therefore, they can both avoid stronger environmental regulations
and also make it more difficult for any other agenda to pass if
the wealthy nations do push for strengthening existing environmental regulations.

mocracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2001).
20. See The WTO in Brief, supra note 7.
21. See WWF, Sustainable Trade for a Living Planet, Reform the WTO, at
http://www.panda.org/resources/publications/sustainability/wtoreform/reform2.htm
I (last visited Oct. 18, 2001).
22. See KLAVS A. HOLM, ULRIK VESTERGAARD KNUDSEN AND KARSTEN VAGN
NIELSEN, WTO OG DEN NYE HANDELSPOLITIK JURIST-OG OKONOMFORBUNDETS
FORLAG 96 (1999) [hereinafter HANDELSPOLITIK].

23. See id. at 96.
24. Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standardsfor Review, and the Use of
Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1036
(1999); see, e.g., U.S. Signals It Will Not Seek Rewrite of WTO Rules for Environment, 17 INSIDE U.S. TRADE, 19, 21 (1999).
25.

See, e.g., HANDELSPOLITIK, supra note 22, at 91; see also U.S. Signals It

Will Not Seek Rewrite of WTO Rules for Environment, supra note 24, at 21.
26. See The WTO in Brief, supra note 7.
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II. DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES III:4 AND XI, THE
ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS, AND PREVIOUS GATT/WTO
PANEL REPORTS
A.

IN SEARCH OF A VIOLATION

The first component of any WTO dispute is a violation of a
trade act, usually a violation of the GATT. Trade barriers are
likely to violate GATT Articles I, III or XI. The Asbestos decision focuses on Articles III and XI. Article III lays down the
"National Treatment" principle, which means that domestic
products and their imported counterparts-known as "like
products"-are to be treated the same. 27 The key to finding a
violation is a determination that products are "like products"
under Article III:4.28 Panels use the following general criteria to
make a "like products" determination: 1) the properties, nature
3)
and quality of the products; 2) the end uses of the products;
29
consumers' tastes and habits; and 4) tariff classification.
While Article III regulates a specific violation with domestic
products, Article XI is a broader mandate. Article XI prohibits
any kind of quantitative restrictions on imports. 30 Under Article
XI, members cannot have quotas or total bans on imported or
31
exported products.

27. See GATT, supra note 3.
28. See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverat
WT/DS1/AB/R
(Oct. 4,
1996),
WT/DS8/AB/R,WT/DS10/AB/R,
ages,
http://www.wto.org (discussing whether Japanese sochu and vodka could be considered "like products" under Article 111:2).
29. See id. at nn. 46, 58, 113; see also United States--Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Panel Report, Jan. 29, 1996, WT/DS2/R, para. 6.8
n. 15 [hereinafter Gasoline Panel Report].
30. GATT, supra note 3.
31. See WTO Appellate Body Report on EC Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WTDS/48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998), at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter EC Measures Concerning Meat]; see also WTO
Panel Report on Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, SD10/R-37S/200 (Oct. 5, 1990), at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Cigarettes]; see also WTO Panel Report on United States-Restrictions on Import of
Tuna, DS21/R - 39S/155 (not adopted Sept. 3, 1991), at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Tuna I]; see also WTO Panel Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, DS29/R (not adopted June 16, 1994), at httpJ/www.worldtradelaw.net/
reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinIl.pdf [hereinafter Tuna III; see also WTO Appellate
Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), at http'//www.wto.org [hereinafter
Shrimp].
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B. AVOIDING SANCTIONS THROUGH AN EXCEPTION

Once it is established that a WTO member violated a substantive obligation under the GATT, the member can argue the
measure falls within one of the exceptions in Article XX. In the
Asbestos case, France invoked subsection (b), which says:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing
in
this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures:32 ...(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health[.]

When an Article XX exception, such as subsection (b), is invoked, the panel undertakes a specific analysis. The panel initially considers whether the policy falls within the range of policies of protecting the life and health of humans, animals, and
plants. 33 This is an easy test to satisfy because the panels do
not examine the necessity of the measure, merely whether it
falls within a broad range of policies of protecting the life and
34
health of humans, animals or plants.
After a panel has concluded that a policy goal falls within
the policy of subsection (b), the measure itself is reviewed under
the "necessity" test. 35 The "necessity" test is not a test of
whether the policy itself is necessary but whether the measure
is necessary to achieve a policy goal. The test examines whether
an alternative measure that is either consistent with the GATT
36
or at least less inconsistent with the GATT can be found.
Finally, the panel looks at whether the measure can be justified under the chapeau of Article XX. The chapeau analysis is
performed as a last measure to ensure that the GATT exceptions are not misused.37 The chapeau analysis is not a test that
evaluates the measure itself; the analysis examines the manner

32. GATT,supra note 3, art. XX(b).
33. See, e.g., Tuna I, supra note 31, para. 5.25.
34. Tuna I, supra note 31, para. 5.25; see Cigarettes, supra note 31, para. 73
(finding smoking constitutes a serious risk to human health).
35. Tuna I, supra note 31, para. 5.27; see Note by Secretariat, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of GAIT,
WT/CTE/W/53/Rev.1, at 13-14 (Oct. 26, 1998) [hereinafter WTO Note].
36. E.g., Cigarettes, supra note 31, para. 75.
37. See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, at 20-21 (Apr. 29, 1996), at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Gasoline Appellate Body Report].

20021

WTO

TREATMENT OFARTICLE XX

in which the measure is applied.3 8 A panel will examine
whether a measure unjustifiably discriminates, arbitrarily dis39
criminates or is a disguised restriction on international trade.
The invocation of an Article XX(b) exception has never been
40
successful because most measures fail the "necessity" test.
That a panel has never found a measure to fall within the human health exception of subsection (b) has caused debate since
the exhaustible resource exception in subsection (g) has been accepted twice. 41 Many commentators question whether WTO
panels view human health as inferior to exhaustible resources,
"unless mankind is itself an exhaustible natural resource."42
C. ILLUSTRATIVE
CLAIMS

GATT/WTO CASELAW ON ENVIRONMENTAL

The following cases illustrate the history of environmental
conflicts in the GATT/WTO.
1.

The CigarettesPanel

The Cigarettes case involved a dispute between Thailand
and the United States. 43 The United States filed a complaint
against Thailand arguing that Thailand's restrictions on the
importation and internal taxation of imported cigarettes were
contrary to the GATT. 44 The Cigarettes Panel found Thailand's
import restrictions inconsistent with GATT Article XI:1. 45 The
Cigarettes Panel went on to analyze whether the measure could
be justified under GATT Article XX(b) exception for human
health. 46 It found measures more consistent with the GATT
were available, making the measure not justified under GATT
38. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 37, at 22, 25.
39. See, e.g., Shrimp, supra note 31, para. 159, 177, 184.
40. See Cigarettes, supra note 31, para. 81; see also Tuna I, supra note 31,
para. 5.28; see also Tuna II supra note 31, para. 5.36-.37.
41. See Shrimp, supra note 31, para. 145 (accepting subsection (g) even though
it failed the chapeau analysis); see also Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note
37, at 21.
42.

Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp /Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 J. INT'L. ECON.

L. 477, 483 (1999).
43. Cigarettes, supra note 31.
44. Id. at3.
45. See id. at 19 (indicating that the GATT Article XI: mandates that contracting parties to the General Agreement cannot institute or maintain import licenses
that prohibit or restrict the importation of any product from any other contracting
party).
46. Id. at 20.
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Article XX(b). 47
2.

Tuna I

Tuna I arose from a dispute over a dolphin-friendly tuna
fishing program enacted by the U.S. government. 48 The Mexican government brought the complaint because the United
49
States enacted an embargo against tuna exported by Mexico.
The intent of the embargo was to encourage a boycott of tuna
caught using methods unsafe to dolphins.5 0 It consisted of both
a primary nation embargo and an intermediary nation em52
bargo. 51 The primary nation embargo targeted Mexico directly.
Moreover, the United States embargoed tuna from countries
that purchased tuna from Mexico. 53 The Tuna I Panel concluded that both the primary and the intermediary embargoes
were inconsistent with GATT Article XI. 54 The United States
invoked Articles XX(b) and (g) exceptions for the primary embargo. 55 The Tuna I Panel concluded that the measure was not
justified under subsection (b) because the United States did not
demonstrate to the Panel that it had exhausted all options consistent with the GATT in its efforts to ensure safety for dolphins. 56 Furthermore, the Panel found that the embargo could
not be supported by subsection (g) because this exception, which
allowed trade restriction, could not be invoked for the purpose of
limiting production or consumption that occurs outside of U.S.
5
jurisdiction. 7

47. See id. at 21 (explaining that Thailand could have imposed laws affecting
only the internal sale, transportation, and/or use of imported products to achieve its
health policy objectives, provided such regulation did not treat imported products
less favorably than like products of national origin).
48. Tuna I, supra note 31.
49. Id. at 3-4.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 2-5.
52. Id. at 2-4.
53. Id. at 4-5.
54. Tuna I, supra note 31, at 40.
55. Id. at 6.
56, See id. at 34-36 (finding that the US could have negotiated international
cooperative arrangements in order to protect dolphins).
57. See id. at 36-37 (finding Article XX(g) was intended to permit contracting
parties to restrict trade in order to limit production or consumption within their
jurisdiction).
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Tuna H

The Netherlands and the EEC later brought a complaint
against the United States regarding the primary and intermediary embargoes of tuna.5 8 Both complainants were directly restricted by the intermediary embargo, thus able to bring a
charge,5 9 and both were entitled to challenge the primary embargo. 60 This led to the Tuna H Panel report.6 1 As in Tuna I,
the Tuna II Panel held that both the primary and intermediary
embargoes were inconsistent with GATT Article XI and neither
embargo was justified under GATT Article XX (b) or (g).62
4.

The Gasoline Case

The Gasoline Panel report was issued in 1996 after Brazil
and Venezuela complained about the discriminatory standards
for imported gasoline in the United States. 63 The United States
established certain compositional and performance specifications for reformulated gasoline, and it also prohibited the dumping of fuel components into conventional gasoline that cause environmentally harmful emissions.64 The Gasoline Panel held
the gasoline program was inconsistent with Article III and could
not be justified under Article XX(b) or (g).65 The Appellate Body
held that the measure did fall within Article XX(g), but failed to
66
meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.
5.

The Shrimp Case

In the Shrimp case, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand
brought a complaint against the United States. 67 The Appellate
Body held that the U.S. embargo of shrimp harvested with
methods that harm the sea turtles was inconsistent with Article
58. Tuna II, supra note 31, at 7, 29.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id. at 29. Although the primary embargo was not being applied to the
Netherlands and the EEC, both were eligible to challenge the primary embargo as a
way of protecting their expectations in competitive relationships with other coun-

tries. Id.
61. See id. at 1.
62. Id. at 57.
63. Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 29, at 1.
64. Id. at 2-3.
65. Id. at 46.
66. Gasoline Appellate Body Report, supra note 37, para. 27.
67. Shrimp, supra note 31, at 1.
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XI.68 Because the measure protected sea turtles, an exhaustible

natural resource, with regulation that applied equally to domestic and foreign harvesting of shrimp, the Shrimp Appellate Body
found the measure to fall within subsection (g). 69 Despite that,
the shrimp embargo did not meet the requirements of the Article XX chapeau because the application of the measure produced
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between members of
70
the WTO.
III. THE ASBESTOS PANEL REPORT
A.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND SUBSTANTIVE OBLIGATIONS

1.

FrenchBan on Asbestos

In the most recent environmental conflict case, Canada
challenged the French ban of asbestos and asbestos containing
products by claiming the ban adversely affected trade of products containing asbestos fibers and was a violation of Article 2 of
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT agreement),
Articles III, XI and Article XXIII: 1(b) of the GATT. 71 Before the
partial ban was in effect, Canada exported 20,000-40,000 tons of
chrysotile fibers to France each year, two-thirds of French im72
ports of such products.
Canada argued the products it exported containing asbestos
and substitute products made in France were "like products"
within the meaning of Article III:4 and the French were therefore discriminating against the Canadian products. 73 The Asbestos Panel examined three characteristics of the Canadian products and the corresponding French substitutes to determine
whether France violated Article III:4: 1) end-uses; 2) consumers'
tastes and habits; and 3) products' properties, nature and quality.74 The Asbestos Panel agreed with Canada, holding that sub68. Id. at 76.
69. Id. at 46-55.
70. Id. at 75.
71. See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 3.8 (explaining that France
passed a decree that included, with some exceptions, a ban on imports containing
asbestos fibers).
72. Id. para. 3.8.
73. Id. para. 8.84.
74. Id. para. 8.112.
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stitute fibers were "like products" because they had similar end
uses. 75 In addition, the Panel compared asbestos-containing cement with substitute fiber-cement and found those to be "like
products"76 and thus held that France also violated Article III:4
with regard to these products. 77 The Asbestos Panel did not
wish to assess whether the products were "like" for the purposes
of risk,7 8 stating that this particular test fell outside the scope of
its usual test, and, if employed, would
render the exception for
79
human and animal health useless.
Prior to the Asbestos decision, no panel had ever found any
measure to fall within the Article XX exceptions. The Asbestos
Panel went against precedent when it found the French ban of
asbestos to both fall within subsection ° (b) and meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX.8
2. Threshold issue
The Asbestos Panel had to establish whether the asbestos
ban fell within the policy of subsection (b) by creating a risk to
public health. 81 As for the fibers not encapsulated, Canada did
not dispute the carcinogenic effects of asbestos; it argued the
causal link between chrysotile fibers might be indirect.8 2 Canada also argued the risk to humans was de minimis because
chrysotile fibers encapsulated in cement will not lead to exposure to carcinogenic agents.8 3 After evaluating substantial
amounts of expert testimony regarding the dangers to humans
exposed to chrysotile fibers, the Asbestos Panel concluded the
EU had shown chrysotile fibers to be dangerous and held a
measure prohibiting all chrysotile fibers, including the encapsu84
lated fibers, fell within the policy of subsection (b).

75. Id. para. 8.125.
76. Id. para. 8.150.
77. See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.158.
78. Id. para. 8.132.
79. Id. para. 8.130.
80. Id. para. 8.241-.242.
81. Id. para. 8.184.
82. Id. para. 8.187.
83. See Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 3.9, 8.189 (discussing Canada's argument that chrysotile fibers in an "inert matrix" such as cement, do not
pose health risks).
84. Id. para. 8.188, 8.194.
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3. Necessity
The Asbestos Panel next analyzed the "necessity" of the
ban.8 5 It analyzed this element by determining whether a "less
inconsistent" measure was available.8 6 The Asbestos Panel examined whether "controlled use," a potential alternative measure, was "(a) [ ] sufficiently effective in the light of France's
health policy objectives and (b) whether it constitutes a reasonably available measure."87 The Panel chose the test regarding "controlled use" because "controlled use" was a "less inconsistent" measure.8 8 The Panel held "controlled use" was not an
acceptable alternative to France's chosen regulation.8 9 It found
several problems connected with "controlled use." The Asbestos
Panel characterized "controlled use" as a health risk even
though not fully scientifically proven, commenting that effective
health regulations cannot wait for scientists to agree on all matters. 90 The Asbestos Panel made it clear it would not secondguess the policy objective of France, even if France's standards
were more stringent than the international standards in the
area. 9 1
4.

Chapeau of Article XX

a.

Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination

The final test was whether the measure fell within the chapeau of Article XX. 92 The Asbestos Panel noted that it was required to examine the application of the measure under the
chapeau analysis. 93 The first step was to determine whether the
measure constituted "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination"
under Article XX.94 The Asbestos Panel analyzed discrimination

85. Id. para. 8.195.
86. Id. para. 8.198-.199. See also Cigarettes, supra note 31, para. 75 (where the
"less inconsistent" method was developed).
87. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.208.
88. Id. para. 8.204.
89. Id. para. 8.222.
90. Id. para. 8.221. But cf EC Measures Concerning Meat, supra note 31,
para. 173 (explaining that countries do not have total discretion in determining the
levels of acceptable risk).
91. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.210.
92. Id. para. 8.223.
93. Id. para. 8.226.
94. Id. para. 8.223.
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first.95 It noted that the measure did not differentiate between
supplier countries; instead, the measure flatly banned the product, regardless of where the product originated. 96 The Asbestos
Panel observed that discrimination could happen if there was a
way for French authorities to give favorable treatment to domestic products. Nevertheless, the Panel concluded there was
no basis for holding the measure discriminatory in its application.97 Canada did not argue the measure was discriminatory in
its application; it merely demonstrated discrimination under
"like products" analysis in Article III, which is not relevant in
98
the Article XX discussion.
Having concluded there was no basis upon which to find
discrimination for purposes of Article XX, the Panel decided it
was not necessary to address whether the measure constituted
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination." 99 It must be noted
that while the Asbestos Panel breathed life into Article XX, it
also sowed the seeds of its demise. By choosing to lecture Canada on the argument it could have made, rather than analyze
the argument Canada actually chose to make, the Asbestos
Panel has provided a formula for making a successful discrimination argument to defeat Article XX.
b.

Disguised Restriction on International Trade

The next step under the chapeau analysis was to determine
if there was a "disguised restriction on international trade." 10 0
The EC initiated this analysis by pointing out that the measure
taken by France was published and thus was not disguised. 101
The Asbestos Panel opined that the important part of "disguised
restriction on international trade" is the word "disguised" since
the measure must already be classified as restricting trade in
order to be considered under the exception. 10 2 The Asbestos
95. Id. para. 8.226.
96. Id. para. 8.228.
97. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.228.
98. Id.
99. Id. para. 8.230.
100. Id. para. 8.231-.239.
101. The measure was published, and the WTO received notification pursuant to
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. Committee on Technical Barriers to
Trade,
Notification-France,
G/TBT/Notif.97/55
(Feb.
21,
1997),
at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Notification]; see Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade, WTO Agreement Annex 1A (Apr. 15, 1994), at http'//www.wto.org [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
102. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.236.
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Panel defined "disguised" as meaning to "conceal beneath deceptive appearances, counterfeit, alter so as to deceive."10 3 Thus, if
a measure meets the requirements of Article XX (b), it will only
constitute abuse if: (1) its purpose is to restrict trade; and (2)
this purpose is disguised. 10 4 The Panel suggested that examining the structure of the measure best performs the test of
whether a measure is a "disguised restriction on international
trade."10 5 The Panel found no "disguised restriction on international trade" because it previously concluded there was no "dis10 6
crimination" under Article XX.
This decision was an important step for the WTO because
both the requirements for the subsection (b) and the chapeau
analysis of Article XX were met for the first time. The impact of
the decision quickly changed when the Asbestos Appellate Body
reviewed and significantly altered the Asbestos Panel's ruling.
IV. A STARTLING DECISION BEFORE THE APPELLATE
BODY REPORT: A BAN ON AMICI CURIAE BRIEFS
Even before the issuance of its report, the Asbestos Appellate Body generated great controversy by enacting its own ban:
a ban on amici curiae briefs by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). 0 7 This was an unexpected turn of events since the Appellate Body in the Shrimp case accepted NGO briefs attached
as exhibits to the U.S. submission and one brief independently
submitted by a group of NGOs.10 8 In the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body chose not to review amici curiae briefs in making
its decision. 0 9 After developing elaborate procedures for NGOs
to apply for leave to file briefs, the Asbestos Appellate Body denied leave to all 11 NGOs" 10 that complied with its procedural
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. para. 8.237.
107. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 56.
108. Shrimpsupra note 31, para. 83, 91, 110.
109. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 50-56.
110. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 57 n.32. The following
people and organizations submitted amicus curiae briefs: Professor Robert Lloyd
Howse (United States); Occupational & Environmental Diseases Association (United
Kingdom); American Public Health Association (United States); Centro de Estudios
Comunitarios de la Universidad Nacional de Rosario (Argentina); Only Nature Endures (India); Korea Asbestos Association (Korea); International Council on Metals
and the Environment and American Chemistry Council (United States); European
Chemical Industry Council (Belgium); Australian Centre for Environmental Law at
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requirements. The Asbestos Appellate Body Report described
the procedures for considering amici curiae participation, but
curiously failed to explain why it exercised its discretion to refuse leave to all amici curiae.11 '
This interim ruling sparked a wave of protest by NGOs.
Greenpeace Political Director, Remi Parmentier, responded by
saying, "Obviously they have not learnt the lesson from Seattle."" 2 The WTO Director General, Mike Moore, may have indirectly answered the question as to why the Appellate Body ruled
as it did. In a speech to the European Parliament in April 2001,
Moore said, "when people are free, they choose to set up political
parties and seek power through elections. This is the true essence of civil society."11 3 Moore's statement echoes the positivist
notion that the will of the citizens is transformed into a higherlevel will of the state." 4 Moore also recognized that NGOs
sometimes have more members than the ruling party of a country." 5 Moore's opinion, which may or may not be inspired by influential WTO members, could explain the Appellate Body's refusal to accept the amici curiae briefs. Certainly, the Asbestos
Appellate Body did not wish to disclose its reasons for the refusal, which could indicate a decision based on political pressure.
Panelists in the WTO are chosen based on their trade expertise, and their knowledge of environmental and heath concerns may be limited. The Appellate Body's decision not to accept amici curiae briefs is disturbing because the WTO is not
required to conduct independent factual investigations or to refer matters to experts. "1 6 Had the Asbestos Appellate Body acthe Australian National University (Australia); Associate Professor Jan McDonald
and Mr. Don Anton (Australia); and a joint application from Foundation for Environmental Law and Development (United Kingdom); Center for International Environmental Law (Switzerland); International Ban Asbestos Secretariat (United Kingdom); Ban Asbestos International and Virtual Network (France); Greenpeace
International (The Netherlands); World Wide Fund for Nature, International (Switzerland); and Lutheran World Federation (Switzerland). Id.
111. Id. para. 50-58.
112. Press Release, Greenpeace, A Court Without Friends: One Year after Seat22, 2000),
at
on
NGOs,
(Nov.
tle the WTO
Slams the Door
http://www.ciel.orgtAnnouncelasbstospr.html.
113. Mike Moore, Trade Development and Democracy: The Need for Reform of
2001),
at
Parliament
Seminar
(Apr.
10,
the
WTO,
European
http://www.wto.orglenglish/news-e/spmm-elspmm57_e.html.
114. See, e.g., Jianming Shen, The Basis of InternationalLaw: Why Nations Observe, 17 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 287, 311-12 (1999).
115. Moore, supranote 113.
116. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 24, at 1045.
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cepted amici curiae briefs, it could have used the information in
environmental and health matters provided by experts in the
briefs as additional information upon which to base its decision.
V. THE ASBESTOS APPELLATE BODY REPORT
A.

A COMPLICATED ANALYSIS

The global community may experience great confusion due
to the Appellate Body's decision. In both the U.S. and Canada,
the media broke the news by stating that the French ban on asbestos was upheld on the basis of human health. 117 Even EU
Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy was quoted as saying the ruling showed "[]egitimate health issues can be put above pure
trade concerns." 118 Contrary to expectations, the Asbestos Appellate Body did not uphold the ban on the basis of the human
health prong of the environmental exception. Instead, the Appellate Body found the measure consistent with Article III:4
once human health concerns were included in the analysis. 119
The Appellate Body found the measure as a whole consistent
with the GATT and that the Article XX exception simply did not
apply. The Appellate Body did uphold the Panel's analysis of
the exception, perhaps to present a good environmental image. 1

20

B.

GATT ARTICLE III:4: LIKE PRODUCTS ANALYSIS

1.

Criticism of the Asbestos Panel'sAnalysis

An important part of the Asbestos Appellate Body's decision
is its analysis of Article III:4, which reversed the Asbestos
Panel's Article III analysis.' 2' The Appellate Body initially
pointed out that the Panel did not analyze the element of risk

117. WTO Upholds French Ban on Asbestos; CanadianIndustry Disappointed,
Canoe
(Mar.
12,
2001),
at
http://www.canoe.ca/MoneyEconomic/
mar12_wtoasbestos.ap.html [hereinafter Canoe]; Panel Upholds Import Ban on Asbestos, NY TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at C2.
118. Canoe, supra note 117.
119. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 113, 148.
120. Id. para. 175, 192.
121. Id. para. 192.
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when comparing "like products."1 22 The Appellate Body decided
to analyze the term "like products" and stated it has done so at
least twenty-four times in previous decisions. 123 It noted that
products in a competitive relationship fall in the category of
1 24
"like products."
As for the specific test, the Appellate Body utilized the same
test as the Asbestos Panel, the market-based approach to likeness with criteria of "physical properties," "end-uses," "consumers' tastes and habits," and "tariff classification." 125 The Appellate Body did not agree with the manner in which the Panel
applied the test. 26 It found fault with the Panel's failure to
compare the likeness of Canadian asbestos products and the
French substitute products under each of the criteria. 27 The
Appellate Body also noted that "physical properties," "end uses,"
"consumers' tastes and habits," and "tariff classification" are not
the only criteria a panel can use to determine whether products
should be characterized as "like." 28 These criteria simply provide a framework within which to analyze the likeness of products, and a panel must take all evidence into account before
rendering a decision.129
2.

End Use and PhysicalPropertiesof Product

The Appellate Body initiated its own analysis by comparing
the physical properties of the Canadian asbestos products with
the French substitute products, emphasizing the element must
be examined without regard to "end use.' 130 The Appellate Body
declared, "Panels must examine fully the physical properties of
products. In particular, panels must examine those physical
properties of products that are likely to influence the competi3
tive relationship between products in the marketplace."' '
122. Id. para. 85.
123. Id. para. 88 n.58.
124. Id. para. 99.
125. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 110.
126. Id.
127. See id.(noting that after comparing only the likeness of the products in
terms of end-use, the Panel concluded that the products could be characterized as
"like").
128. Id. para. 101.
129. Id. para. 102.
130. See id. para. 110-11 (specifically rejecting the Panel's attempt to incorporate the end-use element to circumvent the difference between the physical properties of chrysotile fibers and PVA, cellulose and glass fibers).
131. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 114.
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The Asbestos Appellate Body Report specifically acknowledged that evidence related to health risk should be considered
under the "physical properties" and "consumers' taste" analyses
because the risk of a product may directly correlate to the physical properties of a product.132 In this respect, the Appellate Body
did not agree with the Panel's notion that including a risk assessment nullifies the exception in Article XX (b) because
evaluation of "risk" under Article III:4 does not prevent a measure which is found inconsistent with Article III:4 from being justified under Article XX (b). 133 The Appellate Body then held
that under the "physical properties" test, the asbestos and substitute fibers were not "like products" because substitute fibers
34
were not dangerous.
The Appellate Body commented that the analysis of "enduses" and "consumers' tastes and habits" are particularly important under Article III because the provision is concerned with
competitive relationships in the marketplace.1 35 If the products
are dissimilar in regard to their end uses and the extent to
which consumers are willing to use the products to perform
their intended functions, a country cannot make a restraint of
trade complaint. 136 The Appellate Body determined that the
Panel did not adequately analyze the "end-uses" criterion. 137
Specifically, the Panel did not sufficiently explain the number of
applications for which the various fibers have similar end
uses. 138 In addition, the Panel made no mention of the number
of differing applications to which the products could be put.139
The Appellate Body indicated that in order to show a prima
facie case of likeness, a WTO member cannot rely solely on evidence of similar end-uses. 140 Two other elements must be met
before a case of likeness is supported. The member needs to
132. Id. para. 113, 115.
133. See id. para. 115 (explaining that each provision is examined separately in
regard to "risk").
134. See id. para. 114 (finding the substitute fibers were not toxic).
135. Id. para. 117.
136. Id.
137. See Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 119-20 (finding
panel's analysis "far from comprehensive"). Id. para. 119.
138. See id. (noting that the Panel concluded that the products were "like" based
on a small number of applications for which the products were substitutable).
139. Id. para. 119.
140. See Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerk, The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations-A Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, in THE EU AND THE
WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS Article III-National Treatment, para.

21 (Grainne De Burca and Joanne Scott, Eds., forthcoming 2001).
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provide evidence of unlikeness, based on different end-uses, and
show that the number of similar141applications outweighs the
number of dissimilar applications.
3.

Consumers' Tastes and Habits

The Asbestos Panel declined to utilize the test "[b]ecause
this criterion would not provide clear results."14 2 Robert Howse
explains the test as how consumers would react in an ideal
marketplace where they have full information regarding all
products.14 3 The Appellate Body criticized the Panel's decision
not to apply the test and explained that a health risk is an important factor both consumers and manufacturers consider in
their purchasing decisions. 1 "
4.

Tariff Classification

The fourth criterion tested whether substitute fibers and
asbestos belong in the same "tariff classification." 145 The Panel
found that substitute fibers and asbestos fibers did not belong in
the same "tariff classification."1 46 Based on a lack of evidence
Panel, the Appellate Body did not consider
and analysis by the
147
this last criterion.
5.

Reversing the Decision

In the Appellate Body's view, application of the four tests
led to the conclusion that the products were not "like" products
and thus reversed the findings of the Panel.'"8 The only similarities the Appellate Body found were a few isolated circum149
stances in which the end-uses for the products were the same.
The Appellate Body also analyzed whether cement contain-

141. See id.
142. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.139.
143. See Howse & Tuerk at Article III-National Treatment, para. 17.
144. See Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, at para. 120, 122. The
Appellate Body noted that there are few situations in which the ultimate conclusion
of a "likeness" analysis will be completely clear. Id. para. 120.
145. See, e.g., Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 124.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. para. 132, 141.
149. Id. para. 125.
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ing asbestos is a "like product" to cement containing substitute
fiber using the same criteria as in the above analysis. It held
that the test by the Panel was insufficient and reversed the finding that the two products were "like products." 150 The Appellate
Body found that Canada had not established the basis for holding the products were "like products". 5 '
Taken as a whole, the Appellate Body held that "Canada
has not succeeded in establishing that the measure at issue is
inconsistent with Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994".152 Thus, the
French ban was not in violation of Article 111:4 and accordingly
was not in violation of any of the substantive obligations of the
GATT.153
C. OTHER POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE
OBLIGATIONS

Canada argued that France violated Article 2 of the TBT
Agreement, GATT Articles III: 4 and XI, and GATT Article
XXIII: 1(b) by nullifying or impairing one or several advantages
accruing to Canada directly or indirectly under the WTO
Agreement and impeding the attainment of an objective of the
Agreement. 154 The Panel decided to analyze whether the French
measure fell within the TBT Agreement first. If it did not fall
within this agreement, it would turn to the GATT. 155 The Panel
held that the French notification 156 to the Committee on TBT (in
accordance with Article 2.9.2 of the TBT Agreement) 157 had no
legal effect and was thus not an estoppel. 158 The decisive factor
was, in the view of the Panel, whether the measure fell within
the definition in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement. 159 The Panel
decided that the part of the French decree that prohibited the
marketing of asbestos did not fall within the agreement, 160
whereas the exceptions to the decree did fall within the meaning
150. Id. para. 131-32.
151. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 147.
152. Id. para. 148.
153. Id. para. 193.
154. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 1.2, 3.1- 3.2. Article XXIII:I(b)
is not analyzed in this case note because none of the panels found it to be violated
and it is outside the scope of the "normal" analysis of environmental measures.
155. Id. para. 8.17.
156. See Notification, supra note 101.
157. TBT Agreement, supra note 2, art. 2.9.2.
158. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.60.
159. Id. para. 8.28.
160. Id. para. 8.63.

2002]

WTO

TREATMENT OFARTICLE XX

of the agreement. 161 Howse describes this argument that a total
ban falls outside the TBT Agreement as "bizarre."1 62 The Panel
saw no reason to pursue a TBT analysis since Canada did not
make any special claim regarding the exceptions. 163 The Panel
jumped over the analysis of the TBT Agreement, most likely because no case so far has involved an analysis of this very complicated agreement.
The Appellate Body also analyzed Canada's argument regarding the applicability of the TBT Agreement. It found that
the measure could not be split up for the purposes of the TBT
Agreement, but must be analyzed as a whole. 164 The Appellate
Body then concluded that the measure taken as a whole did fall
within the scope of the TBT Agreement. 65 It did not wish to
make an analysis of it, however, due to the Panel's lack of findings under the agreement and the novelty of the legal interpretation of the agreement. 166 The exact outcome of a TBT Agreement analysis would have been is nearly impossible to tell
because the Agreement has never been analyzed.
After the analysis of whether the TBT Agreement applied,
the Panel turned to the Article III:4 analysis and found the
French measure violated this Article. 67 Therefore, the Panel
found it unnecessary to examine whether the measure was in
violation of Article XI:1.168 The Appellate Body held that Article
III:4 was not violated, but did not address Article XI because it
was not on appeal. 169 Thus, there was no finding of violations of
any of the substantive obligations under the GATT. 1 0
VI. THE ASBESTOS CASE IN PERSPECTIVE
A. POLICY MAKING
One may pose the question of whether the Appellate Body
acted similarly to the U.S. Supreme Court and the ECJ in its
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. para. 8.70.
See Howse & Tuerk at Introduction, para. 7.
Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.72-.73.
Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 64.
Id. para. 75.
Id. para. 81-83.
Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.73.
Id. para. 8.159.
Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 11-22.
Id. para. 148-55.
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"policy making." The answer is yes. After it determined there
was no violation of the substantive obligations under the GATT,
the Article XX exception became totally irrelevant. 171 Even so,
the Appellate Body obviously wished to demonstrate its sensitivity to the policy regarding internal human health regulations by
upholding the Panel's analysis of the Article XX exception.
B.

JUDICIAL ABSTENTION

The choice to not interpret Article XI and the TBT Agreement is probably not policy making, but merely a practical example of judicial abstention. There were no findings of fact regarding either issue by the Panel, so the Appellate Body was in
a poor position to opine. An appellate body found itself in a
similar situation in the decision on Argentina-Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Footwear, where it also had to choose
between two substantive obligations. 172 In this case, the Panel
found Argentina to be in violation of the Agreement on Safeguards,' 7 3 but found GATT Article XIX did not apply. 74 The
Appellate Body held that both the Safeguards Agreement and
GATT Article XIX applied, but found it unnecessary to make an
Article XIX analysis after the measure in dispute was found to
violate the Safeguards Agreement. 75 Similarly, in the decision
on Korea-Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain
Dairy Products, the Panel found no violation of Article XIX, but
found a violation of the Safeguards Agreement. 76 The Appellate
Body decided that Article XIX did apply, but refrained from interpreting it due to insufficient factual findings by the Panel. 17
Both Argentina-Footwearand Korea Dairy differ from the Asbes171. Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 2, para. 8.236. The Panel in the Asbestos case describes that in order to be considered under an exception, the measure
needs to be in violation of one of the substantive obligations. Id.
172. Appellate Body Report on Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Footwear, WT/DS/121AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999), at http'//www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/dispu.e/121abr.doc [hereinafter Argentine Footwear]. In this case, Argentina had passed a resolution placing certain safeguard measures on imports of footwear. Id.
173. Agreement of Safeguards, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs el
legal-e/final_e.htm (the Agreement of Safeguards is a multilateral agreement that is
binding on all WTO members).
174. Argentine Footwear, supra note 172, para. 9.
175. Id. para. 151.
176. Appellate Body Report on Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/98abr.doc [hereinafter Korea Dairy].
177. Id. para. 92.
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tos case because they in fact found a violation of the substantive
obligations. In Asbestos, the Panel did not find a violation of Article III, and Article XI was not analyzed. No violations were
found of the substantive obligations-leaving a measure that
severely hindered free trade to be in conformity with the GATT.
The Asbestos Panel erred considerably by finding a violation
of Article III and not analyzing possible violations under Article
XI. The Panel's decision rendered the Appellate Body helpless
to find violations of the substantive obligations because the
Panel had made no factual findings or analysis of Article XI,
putting the Appellate Body in a poor position to complete any
analysis. Further complicating the situation is the fact that an
Appellate Body has yet to send a case back to the "lower court"
i.e. the Panel for further review. In this case a further review of
Article XI by the Panel would have likely resulted in a finding
that the measure was in violation of Article XI, and then the Article XX(b) analysis could rightfully be made by the Appellate
Body rather than merely in dicta.
C.

HUMAN HEALTH

To understand the impact of the Asbestos case, one must
place it in context with the environmental measures in previous
GATT/WTO cases. The main difference between the Asbestos
case and other GATT/WTO cases is that the French ban on asbestos protected human health. The Cigarettes case also protected human health, but the measure involved discrimination
between domestic and foreign cigarettes and could, thus, not be
178
accepted under Article XX (b).
In Asbestos, by ruling that the French measure was not in
violation of any substantive obligations, the Appellate Body did
not need to address the Article XX (b) issue. The decision to uphold the Panel's Article XX (b) analysis was a signal to the WTO
to recognize that human health is superior to exhaustible natural resources. The Appellate Body sent the signal by advising,
" [t]he more vital or important [the] common interest or values'
pursued, the easier it would be to accept... [the necessity
test] ."179

178.
179.

See Cigarettes, supra note 31, para. 63, 75 -77, 81.
Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 5, para. 172.
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PRECEDENTIAL VALUE

The message runs deeper in the Asbestos case. The wellworn term "extraterritoriality" from the Tuna cases appears
fresh and renewed.180 When a country attempts to enforce a
standard made within their territorial limits on imported products, that measure has "extraterritorial" effect if it requires
changes in policies or methods of production within the territory
of another country.' 8 ' The Asbestos case signals WTO members
that the Article XX exceptions can be accepted if they can explain trade measures in terms of protecting people, animals,
plants or exhaustible natural resources within their own jurisdictional limits and without requiring others to change any policies or production methods. The new opening for Article XX exceptions makes it important to distinguish between measures
with extraterritorial implications and cases with no extraterritorial implications. So far, the cases with extraterritorial implications are Tuna I, Tuna II, Shrimp, and, to some degree, Gasoline. The Cigarettes measure regulated human health within
the territory of Thailand, the Gasoline measure regulated the
pollution level from gasoline within the United States, and finally, the Asbestos case regulates human health within France.
The Asbestos case belongs to the category of internal measures. The Asbestos decision firmly expresses that if a WTO
member wishes to have a certain level of protection within its
territory, it must have scientific evidence describing the risk,
design the measure to apply equally to imports and to national
products, and apply the measure in a non-discriminatory manner in order to satisfy the chapeau analysis. The category of
measures with extraterritorial implications faces much tougher
scrutiny by the panels. The Asbestos case offers no relief for the
cases falling in this category. Thus, the Asbestos case will not
necessarily serve as an important precedent to the determination of future challenges of all types of environmental measures.
Two points must be made about the precedential effect of
the Asbestos case in future Article XX cases. First, if the Appellate Body wanted to create a good image in the pro-environment
community without authorizing trade barriers based on easy access to invocation of Article XX, a measure with such a limited
scope was an ideal case to accept. Second, the positive discus-

180.
5.31.
181.

See Tuna I, supra note 31, para. 5.26; see also Tuna II, supra note 31, para.
Tuna II, supra note 31, para. 5.31.
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67

sion of Article XX by the Appellate Body is devalued by the reality that is merely dicta. The mystery is why the Appellate Body
did not state the obvious: A quantitative restriction is not in
conformity with Article XI. Had the Appellate Body done this,
then the favorable ruling on Article XX would have been promoted to the realm of full reliance and the precedential value
would have risen accordingly.

